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ABSTRACT 
This thesis considers the best use of network traffic data to increase cyber security. This 
operational problem is one of great concern to network administrators and users 
generally.  Our specific task was performed for the Network Security Division of the 
Army Research Laboratory, who requested we analyze a dataset of cyber-attacks masked 
in a background of representative network traffic (the “Skaion” dataset). We find that 
substantial preprocessing must done before statistical methods can be applied to raw 
network data, that no single predictor is sufficient, and that the most effective statistical 
analysis is logistic regression. Our approach is novel in that we consider not only single 
predictor events, but also combinations of reports from multiple tools. While we consider 
a number of different statistical techniques, we find that the most satisfactory model is 
based on logistic regression. Finally, we conclude that while the Skaion dataset is 
valuable in terms of its new approach to network traffic emulation, the 1999 KDD Cup 
and DARPA-MIT datasets—despite their many shortcomings—are more clearly 
organized and accessible to academic study. Cyber security is a globally important 
problem and datasets like Skaion’s must maximize opportunities for cross-disciplinary 
academic endeavors. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis applies techniques of Military Operations Research to consider the optimal 
use of network traffic data to increase cyber security.  Our specific task was performed 
for the Network Security Division of the Army Research Laboratory, who requested we 
analyze a representative dataset of cyber-attacks masked in a background of 
representative network traffic (the “Skaion” dataset). 
The Skaion dataset was created as a test bed for staging attack simulations against 
notional Intelligence Community (IC) networks, which could then enable opportunities 
for further study and innovation for protection of valuable IC networks. Our approach is 
to consider which of the many predictor events in this dataset best determine when 
malicious activity is taking place.  Our approach is novel in that we consider not only 
single predictor events, but also combinations of reports from multiple tools.  While we 
consider a number of different statistical techniques, we find that the most satisfactory 
model is based on logistic regression.  
For comparison, we researched the DARPA-MIT 1999 dataset and the 1999 KDD 
Cup dataset, and we find that the Skaion dataset differs from these well-known network 
security datasets with regard to the following four key features: 1) the two Skaion 
scenarios we studied are far smaller in terms of the time and amount of data captured;  
2) the Skaion dataset is far less dense with attack activity; 3) the manner in which the 
Skaion dataset “labels” malicious activity from benign activity is unique in that it is 
organized by Internet Protocol (IP) address role (i.e., IPs are either attackers or normal), 
while the other two datasets label each conversation between two terminal IP addresses 
(i.e., a connection is either an attack or normal), which introduces the unrealistic 
implications the other data sets do not: that every conversation originating from an 
attacker IP is an attack, and any IP address that initiates with normal activity will never 
become and attacker and vice-versa; finally, 4) the Skaion data set includes predictions 
from intrusion detection system (IDS) alert logs and predictions of the roles of IP 
addresses, which offers an opportunity to explore methods of data fusion and suppression 
of “noise” in order to minimize and prioritize network alert analysis.   
  xviii
Our approach is to combine these predictions with network diagnostic alerts and 
basic network behavior statistics in an ordinal logistic regression to test its predictive 
ability relative to that of IDS alerts alone.  In doing so, we find that the detection 
percentage increased from 29% (28 of 98 attacks detected) with the IDS alerts alone to 
82.7% (74 of 98 attacks detected) with the ordinal logistic regression predictions.  The 
number of false alarms rises from zero with the IDS alerts to only 15 in the regression 
model, which equates to an overall misclassification rate of 0.13% (24 missed attacks and 
15 false alarms out of 10,894 connections in the validation set).  
The conclusions from our work are threefold: 
1)  No single detection tool or statistical method is adequate to keep the 
network secure, 
2) Given good predictors, simple models can be very powerful, 
3) That network emulators and experimenters need to consider data analysis 
when they design their projects so that detailed statistical analysis may be 
done rapidly.  This is the greatest opportunity for Operations Research and 
Network Security Analysts to bridge the gap between professions.   
The operational impact of our work is immediate.  By understanding the types of 
data that are most useful for detecting threats, the processing may be allocated optimally, 
and less metadata (currently 10% of network capacity) will be required.  Finally, we see 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Security in cyberspace, or cyber security, is an area of growing National and 
Department of Defense (DoD) interest.  The formation of the US CYBERCOM, the 
Navy’s TENTH FLEET and the merging of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
(OPNAV) Naval Intelligence (N2) and Communications (N6) directorates mark the 
recognition of cyber warfare as a primary warfare area, as well as the National Strategy 
for Cyberspace. 
 Applications of Operations Research to Cyber Security is a growing area, 
acknowledged both by the Cyber community of practice and the OR community.  In 
March of 2011 the Military Operations Research Society (MORS) held a special meeting 
titled Mission Assurance: Analysis for Cyber Operations for which seven working groups 
convened to discuss issues linking OR to cyber studies. Among the panels’ findings were 
the following opportunities for the application of OR capabilities: 
 Force-on-force analysis that accurately accounts for cyber effects and 
actions. 
 Statistical process control techniques to enhance situational awareness and 
threat awareness. 
 Design of experiments methodologies to help assess rapidly fielded 
equipment and systems. 
 Application of neural networks to help detect anomalies and hostile 
activity. 
 Decision analysis tools and techniques to facilitate response to attacks. 
 Optimization/matching techniques to address requirements prioritization. 
 Manpower analysis tools and methodologies to assist with those issues [1].  
The Synthesis Working Group closed their findings with the following 
recommendation: 
The Synthesis Working Group observes that the analysis communities 
across the Services need to make applying these and other methods in our 
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toolkits to the Cyber arena a priority. For this to be successful, however, it 
is critical that there be an associated “pull” from the Cyber community 
itself for this kind of help. We emphasize that the Leaders’ roles in both 
communities are key! [1] 
An example of this leadership “pull” was demonstrated in large part at the 80th MORS 
Symposium where General William Shelton, Commander, Air Force Space Command 
served as the keynote speaker and 28 working groups addressed issues related to OR 
applications to cyber operations [2].  Also, in September of 2011, the Naval Postgraduate 
School established the Cyber Academic Group and introduced a Cyber Systems and 
Operations Curriculum to address the cyber topics relevant to DoD leaders and operators 
[3].  Of the many facets of analysis in cyberspace, we focus on a specific problem—
intrusion detection on a trusted network.  In particular, we investigate the utility of a 
particular dataset intended to provoke innovative research in the detection of attacks on a 
U.S. Intelligence Community unclassified network. 
The transition in US Forces to increasing lightness and pin-point lethality has 
come at a cost of increased reliance on computers and the connections between them.  
We loosely call this “the network.”  Because data—both operational and planning—
transits this network, it is a ripe target for adversaries to attempt to either extract valuable 
information or deny the use of it.  A characteristic of conflict in cyberspace or cyber 
conflict is the speed at which it moves.  This rapidly changing landscape means that 
analysts rarely have the opportunity to ask higher-level, policy questions like, “What is 
the best statistical tool to use against cyber data generally.”  The acknowledgment that 
the operators are overtasked coupled with the sense that better analytical efficiency is 
possible has led directly to this work. 
In order to ensure the security of the network, operators—specifically, the U.S. 
Army—collect data from their analysis, but they also generate data sets for experimental 
purposes.  The reason that artificial datasets are required is twofold; first, real data is, for 
lack of better words, real.  This means that it contains security and personally sensitive 
information which organizations are reluctant to share.  Secondly, statistical analysis 
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requires knowledge of “ground truth;” in real-world data, we do not know which events 
are “bad,” how many “bad” events there are, just how many we think are “bad.”  
Both real and experimentally generated datasets can be quite large, in some cases 
exceeding one gigabyte for less than 15 minutes of captured network traffic.  The 
captured data flows back to headquarters on the same network “pipes” that the traffic 
itself flows on; therefore, the act of sending network data in some measure reduces the 
network’s effectiveness.  This creates a challenging analytic problem in that the data used 
to maintain the health of the network itself reduces the capability of the network.  The 
amount and type of data collected needs to be carefully chosen to balance between the 
desires to keep the network “fast” and “secure.”  A perfectly “fast” network that has no 
diagnostic data would not be safe; a perfectly “safe” network that is so clogged with 
metadata as to be unreasonably slow is of no use, either.   Our work seeks to find better 
predictors in the provided data to find a balance between security and speed. 
 Data that is currently collected on cyber-attack discoveries is used forensically by 
the Army and others to build and improve tools for detection and prevention of similar 
attacks, but work remains to be done to determine to what extent the same data can be 
used to detect larger trends and relationships, or whether any particularly useful signals 
exist in the data.   
 Software developed to analyze network traffic for security purposes can be 
developed to maximize sensitivity (i.e., better threat detection without regard to false 
positive rate), or specificity (i.e., better overall classification accuracy).  Tools for threat 
detection can be categorized by whether they detect threats based on specific signature 
characteristics or based on more general statistical characteristics. Signature-based 
detection tools detect known threats by seeking exact matches within network traffic to 
very specific rule sets developed from characteristics seen in previous attack attempts.  
These criteria can take many forms, but they usually require deep packet inspection of the 
information “payload” contained within a network packet.  This type of “fingerprint” 
analysis differs greatly from the more general data-collection and probabilistic analysis  
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associated with the use of statistical methods, which attempt to categorize traffic into 
categories based on more surface level data in order to discern “good” traffic from the 
“bad.” 
Statistical tools can be further categorized by the type of learning methods they 
employ.  Supervised methods are classification methods that rely on inputs of prior, 
correctly-labeled good and bad traffic in order to make predictions of the nature of future 
traffic.  Regression models, kernel function methods, trees, and neural networks are 
examples of supervised methods.  Unsupervised learning, on the other hand, occurs 
without a previously labeled set of data. These methods generally attempt to detect 
anomalous traffic based on its relationship to other traffic, or its “outlierness.”  These 
methods compare traffic data based on their attributes and attempts to establish clusters in 
order to discern normal from anomalous traffic.  This principle relies on good traffic 
falling into relatively “normal” categories, and on bad traffic having distinct, measurable 
characteristics.  Finally, while anomaly detection is generally done using unsupervised 
learning methods like clustering, there exist supervised methods of anomaly detection as 
well. 
Another distinction among detection tools is whether they operate on-line or off-
line.  This refers to whether a particular tool can inspect the traffic and make an 
evaluation in real or near-real time based only on what it has seen up to that point, or 
whether it must wait to analyze an entire interval of data either because the computation 
takes too much time and/or memory to conduct in real time, or because the evaluation is 
only meaningful in the context of the entire interval of data. 
Furthermore, anomaly detection tools of both types can also be developed to 
integrate alerts to general network performance characteristics, such as data throughput at 
a specific node (a server, or a client computer).  These can be useful in detecting the 
symptoms of an attack exploitation which may otherwise seem quite “normal” from the 
perspective of individual packet inspection or IP address statistics.  This signal 
integration could be particularly helpful in detecting so-called “zero-day” attacks, i.e., 
those that rely on previously unknown vulnerabilities.  For example, W32.stuxnet 
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contained 4 “zero-day” attacks [4].  For these novel attacks, analysts generally rely on 
more tailored tools and techniques—often developed and personalized by the analysts 
themselves—to apply what is best described as the art of network security analysis.   
Finally, the establishment and maintenance of what defines “normal” network 
activity is the most difficult part of anomaly detection.  The possible characterizations of 
malicious activity these tools must detect largely overlap the spectrum of normal network 
activity characteristics [5].  Malicious activity could present as seemingly “normal” e-
mail phishing attempts that lure users to malicious web-sites or into fraud scams.  
Another “normal” presentation of malicious activity is port scanning, in which an 
attacker probes servers and computers to find open, unused ports through which they can 
enter the network undetected.  At the other end of the spectrum could be specifically 
directed cyber-attacks which may include objectives such as denial of service (DOS) 
(such as those used by Russia in their conflict with Georgia)[6], attempted exfiltration of 
valuable proprietary, or national security related data from a targeted network location. 
B. OUR ANALYSIS 
For our study, the Army Research Laboratory Network Science Division, located 
in Adelphi, Maryland, and Aberdeen Proving Grounds has provided a labeled dataset 
derived from the Skaion Corporation’s Advanced Research and Development Agency 
(ARDA) Testbed. The primary data in the set is consists of three different scenarios, each 
of which includes simultaneous network packet captures from three different nodes, or 
sensors, in the simulated network.  For the two scenarios we analyze, these capture files 
record a 15 and a 30 minute window of network traffic from the three different locations 
in the form of packets, which are the basic unit of network communication. From these 
packets, characteristics such as source and destination IP addresses, source and 
destination port, network protocols used, packet size in bytes, etc. can be analyzed.  
These characteristics are described in detail in subsequent chapters. To illustrate the 
problems with collecting network data, the 45 minutes of data collected from the three 
different sensor locations has a size of approximately 4 gigabytes (uncompressed). 
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Included with these packet capture files are attack logs from four signature- based 
network intrusion detection systems as well as IP address keys that provide the 
“labeling,” or ground truth as to the roles of each IP address.  In other words, the point of 
origination of each network packet is classified in the file as an attacker, victim, 
background attacker, background scanner, server or user.  This $1.3 million network 
emulation project was contracted by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) in 2003 [7] to simulate realistic attacks on a notional U.S. intelligence 
community (IC) network for the purpose of fostering “innovative research on the 
protection of highly-sensitive assets such as the IC’s own networks and systems [8].” The 
data to be analyzed consists of network packet capture files (PCAP), alert logs from a 
variety of intrusion detection systems (IDS), and an IP key that provides ground truth as 
to the nature of an IP address’ role in the network (i.e., attacker, victim, or benign).  
While our analysis focuses on a 2003 dataset, the methods and techniques we propose are 
broadly applicable.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW OF PREVIOUS WORK 
For high-level discussions of the cyber problem and its importance, we 
recommend the Cyberspace Policy Review [9].  The DoD Lexicon is given in Joint 
Publication 6-0 Joint Communication System [10].  For an in-depth description of 
different types of cyber-attacks, see The Art of Computer Virus Research and Defense 
[11], and for a DoD approved discussion of open problems and their import, see the 
JASON report The Science of Cyber-Security [5].  
For the precise application of statistical methods to network data analysis, we rely 
on Yale University’s Yun Wang [12].  Wang provides a guide to statistical methods in 
the field of network security by taking a comprehensive approach to network security 
history, term definitions, data mining and modeling techniques, and classification 
methods.  Most germane to this study are chapters 9 and 12, which examine supervised 
modeling and classification methods suitable for prediction as well as methods of 
comparing and rating those models. 
Gogoi, Bhattacharyya, Borah and Kalita outline eight supervised and three 
unsupervised approaches to outlier detection in network security [13].  Consistent with 
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our observations, they describe that the primary difficulties with anomaly-based network 
intrusion detection are in the assumptions that: 
1. The majority of the network connections are normal traffic.  Only a 
small amount of traffic is malicious. 
2. Attack traffic is statistically different from benign, i.e., ‘normal’ traffic. 
However, in a real-world network scenario, these assumptions may not 
always be true.  For example, when dealing with DDoS (distributed denial 
of service) or bursty attack detection in computer networks, the anomalous 
traffic is actually more frequent than the normal traffic. [13] 
The first assumption is generally reasonable. The second assumption may hold when the 
attacker is a disorganized, or loosely organized criminal activity.  However, a state- or 
state-sponsored effort should be expected to be sophisticated enough to “cover their 
tracks.”   
Mahoney and Chan [14] examine the 1999 DARPA/Lincoln Laboratory off-line 
evaluation data set (IDEVAL [1] – [3]) and compare the results of six basic anomaly 
detection (AD) systems against 244 labeled instances of 58 different attacks present in 
the data set. The six systems are chosen more for their collective utility with regard to 
different types of Internet traffic than for their particular detection abilities.  The purpose 
of their analysis is to confirm whether mixing real traffic in with the IDEVAL data set 
improved the AD systems’ learning.   
The study finds that mixing improves the detection percentages of all six AD 
systems. This improvement is attributed to the difference in prevalence of “poorly-
behaved artifacts with power law attributes” [14] in the IDEVAL set (low prevalence) 
and in the real traffic (high prevalence).  The higher prevalence of these poorly behaved 
artifacts in the real traffic had the effect of removing them as artifacts, even without 
having to define what the suspected artifacts were.  The results demonstrate that when 
using mixed data, the detection performances of the very basic AD systems chosen for 
the study are raised to levels comparable to the best-performing systems used in the 1999 
evaluation. 
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Yamanishi and Takeuchi, 2002, demonstrate that an online unsupervised outlier 
detection program called SmartSifter can be useful in detecting abnormal activity in both 
intrusion detection and health insurance pathology contexts.  SmartSifter performed well 
in a supervised mode at the 1999 KDD Cup Machine Learning competition where it 
detected 55% of 1,687 intrusions out of a set of 458,078 network accesses in its top 1% 
of ranked data and 82% in its top 5% of ranked data [15].  The novel features of 
SmartSifter are threefold: adaptability to non-stationary sources of data, its rank score has 
a clear statistical and information-theoretic meaning, and it is computationally 
inexpensive and it can handle both categorical and continuous variables [15]. 
Tavallaee, Bagheri, Lu, and Ghorbani [16] conduct a critical analysis of the KDD-
99 dataset mentioned above.  They discuss its design shortcomings and propose a new 
dataset, in which they mitigate two main issues they find with the original dataset; 
namely, that there are too many duplicated records in both the training and test sets, and 
that results among different methods are difficult to distinguish due to a narrow margin of 
difference in performance.  Their corrected dataset is a subset of the original data that 
eliminates duplicated records and adjusts the ratio of records based on a relative level of 
classification difficulty such that the numbers of records of each difficulty level are 
inversely proportional to the numbers found in the original set. Their results show both a 
lower overall accuracy among their chosen models as compared to the original dataset, 
(which shows the tendency of the original set to overestimate performance) as well as 
more varied performance among models.  Finally, they acknowledge that although the 
KDD-99 data is problematic, it remains a benchmark due to the lack of availability of 
publicly available datasets. 
Wang and Kim, 2008, attack the problem of insufficient and unavailable training 
data (and the subsequent unsuitability of regression models and neural networks) in 
network security problems.  Their supervised approach uses a bootstrap resampling 
method to develop a probability model for use when limited or no abnormal information 
is available in training data [17]. 
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D. OBJECTIVES 
This study investigates methods of variable selection, data coding and modeling 
in the context of the Skaion data set.  The intent is to analyze selected, likely successful 
data mining and statistical methods and report on their utility with respect to detection 
probabilities and false positive rates in the Skaion data set.  Our research questions are:  
“What are effective methods of data collection and organization in order to evaluate the 
performance of logistic regression in detection of cyber-attacks against the Skaion 
dataset, and what general conclusions may be drawn for statistical techniques for use in 
network detection?” 
This analysis provides the Army Research Laboratory specifically and the 
Department of Defense generally with insight into the Skaion data set, as well as 
foundational work for further Operations Research cyber security analysis efforts. 
E. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The Skaion data set is composed of five attack vignettes and also has multiple 
releases.  This study focuses on attack vignettes 4s1 and 4s3 from release 4a.  Attack 4s1 
is a basic Common Gateway Interface (CGI) Overflow attempt.  A CGI is a commonly 
used application framework for programs like Internet shopping carts and website search 
engines and they can be hijacked by code intended to disable their ability to allow limited 
access to the information and program function of the host.  Instead of a shopping cart, 
Skaion uses a petition website linked to an SQL database for storing the signers’ data.  
The attacker uses a malicious code to overflow the CGI application’s buffer, allowing full 
access to the information in the database.  Scenario 4s3 is a variation of the same attack 
that attempts to mask its true point of origin of the main attacker by sending out decoy 
requests that trigger the same alerts from the Snort intrusion detection systems (IDS).  
Both attack scenarios also include the background attacks and scanners that are inherent 
in the Skaion test bed design.   
The study focuses analysis from an IP address-centric approach and investigates 
methods to detect whether, within the time frame of the data set, a particular IP address is 
malicious.  When examining packets, the response variable is determined by the ground-
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truth classification of the source IP address as either “ATTACKER,” “BACKGROUND 
ATTACKER” or “BACKGROUND SCANNER.” The primary attacker of interest and 
the background attackers and scanners comprise the subset of malicious IP addresses.  
Scanners are IP addresses that run programs designed to test which ports are open on a 
host or server.  When a port is open or active, the service that is running on that port may 
be used to exploit network security vulnerabilities [12].  
We are primarily concerned with the statistical aspects of the problem, and 
guiding investments at a mid- to high- level.  We do not attempt to conduct a detailed 
forensic analysis of the Skaion data set and we have necessarily abstracted away many of 
the more detailed aspects of computer coding, etc.  The primary reason for this is to avoid 
incorrect inferences relative to the context of the data and the precise nature of the 
relationships among the classifiers. 
Finally, the study does not provide an in-depth analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the IDS tools that provide alert responses in the data set.  Rather, the 
responses serve as classifiers and their results are compared as subsets of the overall data 
set to draw out the significant characteristics of the types of traffic that generate alerts at 
varying levels of true and false positive and negative. 
F. COURSE OF STUDY 
The outline of the thesis is as follows:  In Chapter II, we cover the nature of the 
data set, providing a comparison of the two attack scenarios and a description of the 
Skaion ARDA Testbed Design.  In Chapter III, we describe the nature of the variables 
collected, the methodologies used. In Chapter IV, we discuss the results and analysis of 
the chosen methods against both the Skaion dataset and another representative dataset. 




A. DATA SET BACKGROUND 
1. Skaion ARDA Testbed Design 
Skaion chose to design its test bed after the Open Source Information System 
(OSIS), which in 2003 was the U.S. intelligence community’s unclassified open source 
intelligence network.  The OSIS network and its content were de-coupled in 2006 and 
replaced with DNI-U and Intelink-U, respectively [18]. 
This choice of OSIS was guided by Skaion’s contract requirement “to simulate 
realistic attacks on a notional U.S. intelligence community (IC) network for the purpose 
of fostering “innovative research on the protection of highly-sensitive assets such as the 
IC’s own networks and systems” [7].  Skaion did not conduct attacks against the actual 
network, but instead constructed a simulated model of the OSIS network and used 
network emulation algorithms to build realistic network traffic on a test bed of 
approximately 20 physical machines. The test bed includes real (i.e., physical) hosts 
(servers and clients that maintain websites), network infrastructure components (routers, 
hubs and firewalls that control network access and flow), and several hundred virtual 
hosts simulated by traffic generation machines using Skaion’s proprietary network 
emulation algorithms.  The simulated OSIS network is connected to a model Internet, 
which is simulated by two other traffic generation (emulation) machines. The structure of 














Figure 1.   Architecture of Skaion’s test bed design. Sensor locations are indicated by 
the blue arrows.  The machines labled “Sniffer” run a program called 
tcpdump, which collects and inspects each packet passing through the 
indicated point in the network.  The machines labeled “Snort” and 
“Dragon” are running intrusion detection system (IDS) programs by those 
names that do some automated analysis of the packets passing through that 
point in the network.  Alerts are generated based on pre-determined rule sets 
(i.e., correlation between a packet’s originating IP address and a “hot list” 
of known malicious IP addresses). (Image from unpublished documentation 
included within the Skaion Data Set). 
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The background traffic generated by the Skaion Corporation is representative of 
the Non-secure Internet Protocol Network (NIPRNET) traffic at the Air Force Research 
Laboratory (AFRL) in Rome, NY. NIPRNET is the common infrastructure for 
unclassified general administrative and training data and is the closest analogue in the 
DoD to civilian business IT Enterprise systems. The traffic is anonymized by 
transforming IP and Ethernet addresses and replacing IP and Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) payloads with simple checksums.  Anonymization is required to protect 
the privacy and personal information of the AFRL users.  The data collection portion of 
the scenarios we analyze was conducted in January and February of 2004 and consists of 
a 15 to 30 minute capture (scenario dependent) from three different network sensors.  
These sensors are placed at different locations in the network and operate like a 
listening/recording device.  These six separate 15–30 minute (~2 hours 15 minutes) of 
packet captures sum to approximately 4 gigabytes of total data.  To put this in context, 
this equates to about 8 hours of high definition recorded video, or about 1,000 mp3 music 
files. 
The entire project conducted more than the two attack scenarios that we address, 
but only one of these was included in the data set provided by ARL’s Network Science 
Division.  Because this attack scenario focused on an e-mail phishing attack, as described 
in Chapter I, its relevance to the other two data sets was minimal and we chose not to 
include it in our analysis.  Anonymization of the data is inherent in the design of the 
network emulation, since it does not retain any actual user activity.  This is an important 
feature due to the sensitivity of what otherwise could include personally identifiable, and 
exploitable, information. 
The Skaion dataset’s companion documentation outlines the following limitations 
that exist due to anonymization of the network traffic: 
 Cannot characterize the relative likelihoods of types of networks that 
could be used to probe another network 
 Cannot distinguish between probes, attacks, and non-malicious but broken 
traffic 
 Cannot tell when a non-standard protocol is run over a standard port (NFS 
over SMPT, or backdoors run over port 80). 
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2. Attack Scenarios 
The dataset provided by ARL’s Network Science Division was a partial dataset 
that included three attack scenarios.  We focused on two in particular, using the first 
scenario (4a4s1) as a training dataset, and the second scenario (4a4s3) as a test dataset. 
a. Dataset 4a4s1: Basic CGI-Overflow Attack 
The basic attack in this dataset is an attempt to conduct a buffer overflow 
attack against a Common Gateway Interface (CGI) script.  The CGI script allows users to 
log on and digitally sign a petition, the signatures of which are stored in an SQL database.  
The script connects with the database and uses the buffer overflow to query all the 
information in the database, gaining access to what should be protected information. 
b. Dataset 4a4s3: CGI-Overflow with Chaff 
Attack scenario 4a4s3 is similar to 4a4s1 except that the attack is preceded 
by sending sporadic requests that produce the same Snort IDS alerts as the actual attack, 
thus masking the true attempt.  
3. Summary Statistics from Scenarios 4a4s1 and 4a4s3 
Table 1 illustrates some of the major differences between the two attack 
scenarios.  The most notable difference is in the distribution of malicious activity, but the 
difference is not as clear-cut as one might initially suspect.  Because the intent of 4a4s3 is 
to create more chaff traffic to mask the intrusion, one might think this means more 
overall malicious activity, or at least a higher density of malicious activity.   
While 4a4s3 does have 47% more malicious IP addresses active within a capture 
period that is half as long as 4a4s1, the overall numbers of packets and kilobytes 
associated with these malicious IP addresses drops by 80% and 93%, respectively, from 
4a4s1 to 4a4s3.  While it makes sense that the 50% decrease in time of capture should 
necessarily decrease the amount of overall malicious traffic, this does not account for the 
fact that the overall density of malicious traffic, represented by the ratio of malicious 
activity to total activity, drops from 4a4s1 to 4a4s3 by a factor of 10. 
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Table 1.   This table lists some of the key differences between the two attack  
scenarios.  4a4s1 captures twice as much time and approximately 30% more  
data, but generates less than half the number of Diagnosis Events as 4a4s3,  
which has more attackers (25 versus 17 in 4a4s1), but is ten times less dense  
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Furthermore, although scenario 4a4s3 is half as long and less dense with traffic 
from malicious IP addresses by a factor of 10, the traffic those IP addresses are sending 
results in more than twice the number of diagnosis events as compared to 4a4s1 (see 
Table 1).  Diagnosis Events are system and security alerts that occur in the normal 
interaction between systems and are encoded in the packet details.  Many Diagnosis 
Events are benign indications of system performance issues and incorrect settings, but 
some can be direct indications of malicious activity.  For example, the main attacker in 
both scenarios is the only IP address to cause the alert below “HTTP Suspicious 
Conversation,” which occurred because it sent non-HTTP encoded traffic through an 
HTTP port.   
B. ACCESSING THE DATA 
Pre-processing the data for analysis represented a significant portion of our 
analytic effort, and took approximately 400 analyst-man hours (or 10 man-weeks) to 
accomplish.  More than anything else, our experience with transforming the data to a 
useful analytic form highlights the difficulties with applying statistical methods to 
computer network data, as the formats are typically not amicable to analysis.  Much of 
what follows was determined by working with software that was poorly documented—
when it was documented at all—therefore much of this work was performed by trial-and-
error.  For some Visual Basic (VBA) code used in preprocessing data, see Appendix A.  
Because of the difficulties involved with anonymization of data and 
generalization of network vulnerabilities, there are few publicly available network 
security datasets.  Those that are available can be placed in two basic categories.  The 
first is, like the Skaion dataset, largely unprocessed packet capture data accompanied by 
some kind of key which indicates attacks or attackers.  The second category comes with 
some amount of pre-processing already complete.  This type of dataset allows the analyst 
to bypass the major data storage and processing overhead and simply test models 
assuming the variables included in the dataset are sufficient. 
A good example of the second type of data set is the 1999 KDD-Cup data set.  
This is an older data set that was developed for The Third International Knowledge 
Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition, and it is considered an industry standard 
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for testing statistical methods against network security threats [19].  The main difference 
between the KDD-cup and Skaion data sets is that the KDD-cup is presented as 
collections of comma separated values (.csv) files in which each row represents a 
connection between two IP addresses. Each row is labeled as either “normal” or as one of 
24 attack types, and each connection is described by 41 predictor variable columns.  The 
other main difference between the data sets is that KDD-cup is far more attack dense than 
Skaion.  For a more in-depth description of the KDD-cup dataset, see Appendix B. 
1. Unpacking, Opening and Exporting Data from Packet Capture Files 
Skaion captured their packet data using freeware called TCPDump, stored the 
files using the .dmp (“dump”) file extension, and compressed that file into a .tar.gz file.  
The .tar extension name is derivative of a holdover term, tape archive, which is an 
outmoded method of data capture and storage.  The .gz extension means GNU (which is a 
recursive acronym that stands for Gnu’s Not Unix) Zipped Archive file (.gz).  This 
compression method is optimized for packet data and is easily decompressed in a Unix 
environment or with open source software on a non-Unix machine.  We used a program 
called 7-Zip to decompress and unpack the .tar.gz file. 
Our choice of software for inspection and pre-processing the capture files was 
also an open source program called Capsa from Colasoft®.  This program is available in 
both free version and enterprise versions.  Because we were only viewing and processing 
already captured data and not setting up a network monitoring sensor ourselves, the 
freeware version was sufficient. 
Because Capsa could not read the .dmp file format of Skaion’s capture files, we 
used another popular network protocol analyzing software package called Wireshark 
(Development Version 1.7.0) to open the .dmp file and save it as a Wireshark capture file 
(.pcap).  Once open, Capsa was used to accomplish the following: 
1. Combine all three files and collect summary statistics on the entire capture 
file from all three sensor locations, 
2. Open each sensor capture file individually for pre-processing and export 
of data sorted by IP address, 
3. Export all IP Statistics (.csv), 
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4. Export all Diagnosis Events (.csv), 
5. Export all Diagnosis Items (.csv). 
 
Figure 2.   The datasets were manipulated exclusively in a Microsoft Windows® 
environment, using Wireshark® to convert the capture file extension so 
Capsa® could be used to extract statistics.  Microsoft Excel® was used to 
organize the data in a format exportable to SAS’s JMP® statistical software. 
2. Processing the Exported Data 
Along with the raw packet data, Skaion included an IP Address Key that 
identified the majority of IP Addresses in the file as attackers, victims, client servers, 
background attackers, background scanners or as nothing at all (these amounted to 
relatively few, and thus were assumed to be the source of additional benign background 
traffic).  These IP Keys were used to “label” the data set according to the roles the IP 
Address plays in each scenario.   
Another file, external to both Capsa and the provided capture files, was a key 
providing descriptions and the event code number to each diagnosis event.  These code 
numbers can be used as dependent variable labels and their columns would indicate how 
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many of each diagnosis event could be attributed to each IP Address.  These codes can 
also be summed by IP or conversation based on the priority of the event (Alarm, Notice 
or Information), or by the nature of the event (Security, Performance or Fault).  The file 
was not all-inclusive of every diagnosis event possible, but only the ones seen in the two 
attack scenarios in the data set.  This amounted to 18 events.  
Once the pertinent data was exported from Capsa, the following steps were 
completed in Microsoft Excel® (See Appendix A. for macro code): 
 For each sensor location (COLO, BPRD, TRUNK) and each scenario 
(4a4s1 and 4a4s3) combine IP Statistics.csv, Diagnosis Events.csv, Error 
Key.csv, and IP Key.csv, 
 Rename each tab using the following generic names: IP Stats, Diagnosis 
Events, Error Key, ip-key  
 Save file as 4a4sX XXXX IP Stats.xlsx (XXXX = COLO, BPRD or 
TRUNK),  
 Import macro module (consisting of the macros in Section C. below), 
 Run AddErrorClassColumns() macro, 
 Run DeleteCountryRows() macro, 
 Delete Column BC, then scroll down and delete all excess rows (those 
without IP addresses in Column A) at the bottom of the active worksheet, 
 Run FillErrorClassCols() macro, 
 Rename new tab “4A4SX XXX Final.xlsx,” 
 Run DeleteExtraDataTags() macro, 
 Run AddClassCols() macro, 
 Delete extra rows at the bottom of the worksheet, 




1. Dependent Variables 
We identify the following variables as dependent, as they are derived from the 
ground truth IP key provided by Skaion.  Their use as target variables can be enhanced by 
recoding on a binary scale (malicious IP or benign IP) or an ordinal scale (ranking of IP 
addresses by their relative threat levels).  There is only one main attacker IP address in 
each data set, and there are 23 and 24 background attackers and scanners in 4a4s1 and 
4a4s3, respectively. 
These dependent variables can be explored from two different perspectives in this 
data set.  One way to organize the data is by IP address, which yields one row of data for 
each of the 1,976 or 1,883 IP addresses in each attack scenario.  The other method is from 
the perspective of connections, or conversations, between two different IP addresses.  We 
address the advantages, disadvantages and model performance from both perspectives. 
Table 2.   IP Key and ground truth of dependent variables. IP classifications can be  
ranked categorically by classifier, by ordinal threat level, or by a binary flag 












ATTACKER Primary attacker of interest (only one in each file) 
MALICIOUS 
(1) 4 1 1 
BACKGROUND 
ATTACKER 
Attackers inherent in the Skaion 
ARDA test bed design, provided for 
realism 
MALICIOUS
(1) 3 4 5 
BACKGROUND 
SCANNER 
Scanners inherent in the Skaion 
ARDA test bed design, provided for 
realism 
MALICIOUS
(1) 2 21 21 
CHAFF 
Attackers provided in 4a4s3which 
emulate characteristics of the actual 
attacker’s behavior in order to mask 
the actual attacker’s origin/identity 
BENIGN (0) 1 0 5 
SERVER Neutral role description BENIGN (0) 0 1596 1509 
CLIENT Neutral role description BENIGN (0) 0 289 277 
VICTIM Target of ATTACKER  BENIGN (0) 0 1 1 
[Blanks] Unclassified (benign) background traffic BENIGN (0) 0 65 64 
TOTAL    1976 1883 
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2. Predictor Variables 
We divide the dependent variables into three categories based on their sources. 
The first set comes from comma separated value (.csv) files within the data set that give 
IP address role predictions of four different intrusion detection (IDS) tools.  These 
predictions are similar in format to the dependent variables described in Table 1.  We 
refer to these variables as Tool Predictions.  The IDS tools used by Skaion were Dragon, 
and three different versions of Snort (versions 1.2.1, 2.3.2, and 2.4.1).  The basic 
differences between the rule sets for these tools are described in Appendix X, but the 
scope of this thesis does not include an in-depth discussion or analysis of these rule sets.  
Rather, we utilize these tools as a radar operator may view four different radar systems 
designed to detect different types of threats or operate better in different types of 
environments.  Leveraging the responses from these tools allows us to explore methods 
of comparing IDS performance and determining how to best utilize the valuable 
information provided by these tools and their highly contextual rule sets. 
The second set of variables, which we will refer to as Diagnostic Events, are 
summations of the types and severity levels of alarms generated by the Capsa software 
we used to access the packet data.  Like the Tool Predictions, the coding and computing 
overhead associated with generating the responses is already completed by the software, 
so collecting the data for these variables is a simple process that consists of exporting the 
event log using the software’s graphics user interface (GUI) and associating the alarms 
with IP addresses in the main data set.  The categories and codes associated with the 
different alarms are described in Table 2. 
The third set of variables, which we refer to as Conversation Statistics, reflect 
the nature of the data transfer that occurs between two IP addresses.  These variables are 
listed and described in Table 3. 
The following predictor variables represent aggregated network statistics for each 
individual IP address collected over approximately a 15 minute window.  The data was 
analyzed and aggregated using a combination of Wireshark and Capsa.  These programs 
decompress, decode and organize data stored in packet form so that it can be reorganized 
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and output in .csv or .xls file formats for statistical analysis.  The variables described in 
Table 3 result from organizing the packet statistics by IP Address.  They describe the 
behavior of each IP address in its role as an originator or end receiver of data. 
Table 3.   Predictor variables.  Generated from data encoded in packets, these variables 
provide easily aggregated numerical statistics describing the network behavior of 
































































































The regression results in Chapters III and IV are generated by default models in 
SAS’s statistics package, commonly referred to as “JMP” (Pro Version 10), implemented 
on a Gateway ZX6971 with an Intel® Pentium® 260GHz processor running the 64-bit 
Windows 7 Home Premium operating system with 4 GB RAM.  For details reference the 
online JMP documentation [20]. 
During data exploration, we experimented with several methods including neural 
networks, classification and regression trees, and clustering.  Given the same types of 
variables, these methods either returned results that were less accurate than logistic 
regression or achieved better predictive results through over-fitting the data. 
A. EXPLORING DEPENDENT VARIABLE PERSPECTIVES 
The data created by Skaion is “labeled” according to the roles played by 
individual IP addresses (attacker, background attacker, background scanner, victim, 
server, etc.).  In other words, whether the data is sorted by IP address (~2000 rows), 
conversations (~20,000 rows), or packets (~500,000 rows), ultimately the value taken by 
the response variable is directly related to the labeled role of the IP address, the IP 
address associated with the machine initiating a connection, or the source IP address of 
the packet. 
Sorting the data by packets allows the most detailed analysis because the data is 
broken down to its most basic level.  Unfortunately, because our data set does not label 
individual packets as being specifically malicious, we cannot achieve any more resolution 
beyond a particular packet’s association with a maliciously labeled IP address as its 
originator.  We could label each packet according to its source, but we would be 
assuming that every packet sent by a malicious IP address is a malicious packet.  While 
this method of labeling may be sufficient for the purpose of characterizing the behavior 
of a malicious IP address, it is counterproductive to the purpose of classifying benign and 
malicious packets because it classifies benign packets from malicious IP addresses as 
malicious, which makes benign packets from benign IP addresses less distinguishable. 
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Sorting the data by IP address condenses the data into the fewest number of rows, 
but has the limitation of aggregating predictor data in such a way as to limit the 
sensitivity of prediction and classification models by decreasing the dispersion of the 
data.  For example, at the packet level one can determine the number of bytes contained 
within the packet, but at the IP level, only the mean, median and standard deviation of all 
the packets sent by that IP address for the entire time period can be captured.  While this 
level of data can still be useful, the processing required for collection and calculation of 
that data for each IP address is computationally expensive.  
The compromise between these two approaches is to organize the data and collect 
aggregated statistics associated with the conversations (or connections) between IP 
addresses.  This preserves more resolution than aggregating statistics by IP address, but 
also compresses the data more than packet-based analysis.  While the aggregation is 
somewhat more contextual than IP-based organization, because of the labeling scheme, it 
is still necessary to assume that every conversation originating with a maliciously labeled 
IP address is a malicious conversation. 
Finally, the choice of whether to code the response variable as either categorical 
or binary depends on the goal of the analysis.  From a practical perspective, as long as the 
malicious conversations are distinguished from the benign, the binary response variable 
sufficiently separates the signal and the noise from the perspective of a network security 
analyst.  On the other hand, if one desires to know which categories of activity are more 
or less reliably modeled, then the categorical coding should be used.  
B. SELECTING PREDICTOR VARIABLES FOR ORDINAL LOGISTIC 
REGRESSION 
Each of the three main categories of predictor variables has its own set of 
advantages.  Use of the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) tool prediction values return 
zero false positives because they are designed to maximize specificity, which means their 
resulting low sensitivity makes their detection rate as a group relatively low.  The 
Diagnostic Event variables are easy to access and collect, but perform very poorly as 
predictors due to their high sensitivity.  IP Conversation statistics alone perform better 
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than the other two categories in terms of detection percentage, but not well enough to 
stand on their own.  Our task is to determine how best to combine or layer these 
predictors to maximize detection rates while minimizing false positive rates. 
1. Comparison of IDS Tools: 
While all four IDS tools are distinct in terms of their rule sets, SNORT 2.3.2 and 
SNORT 2.4.1 respond identically to each other in the context of this data set, thus for our 
purposes they are interchangeable. Furthermore, neither tool makes any novel predictions 
as compared to SNORT 2.1.2 and Dragon, so for our purposes they are identical.   
Table 4 shows the different prediction performance of these IDS tools taken 
independently.  All three have a 0% false positive rate. Although SNORT 2.1.2 is the best 
performer, with an overall detection rate of only 21.5% it is by no means a suitable stand-
alone detection tool.  When combined with Dragon’s unique positive predictions, they 
detect 29.3% of the intrusions.  Table 4 presents the confusion matrix for the various 
tools, which compares the true and false positive rates of the various tools with ground 
truth. 
Table 4.   The highlighted diagonals show false positive (top right) and false negative 
(bottom left) for each of the tools.  SNORT 2.1.2 and Dragon perform well 
against the main attacker (4) and background attackers (3), but misclassify 
background scanners (2) as benign (0).  Although the tools do not make a 
prediction for chaff (1), they correctly distinguish the chaff from the main 
attacker, which is desirable.  SNORT 2.4.1 performs worst and adds no value as a 
predictor since the main attacker is missed and it makes no additional detections 
from those already covered by the first two IDS tools. 
IDS Tool Confusion Matrices 
 SNORT 2.1.2  Dragon SNORT 2.4.1  0 2 3 4 0 3 4 0 2 3
Ground 
Truth Row% Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row %
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2 85.81% 14.19% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 94.19% 5.81% 0.00%
3 14.29% 0.00% 85.71% 0.00% 28.57% 71.43% 0.00% 35.71% 0.00% 64.29%
4 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
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2. IP Conversation Statistics and Diagnostic Events 
By themselves in a logistic regression, the IP Conversation Statistics group of 
variables accurately detects 66% of the threats against a categorical response variable and 
68% against a binary response variable, but this higher detection comes at the expense of 
.61% false positive rate.  Because only 1.2% of the data meets the threshold for a 
malicious prediction, this level of performance means that more than half of the hits 
resulting from the regression are false positives.  It is important in this context to 
remember the size of the dataset and realize that .61% translates in real terms to 
approximately 270 false positive events per sensor, per hour. 
Diagnostic events, on the other hand, provide virtually no prediction value at all.  
Because the alerts are spread so evenly across benign and malicious traffic alike, there is 
no resolution among them and therefore no added value from the variables as a group in a 
logistic regression.   
C. ORDINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS: GROUPED 
VARIABLES 
Tables 5 and 6 display modeling results for variables by category based on their 
performance in first-order ordinal logistic regression models.  The statistics in these 
tables indicate that misclassification rates alone are not a good indication of the 
suitability of a model.  First of all, because less than 1% of the data is malicious, there is 
little resolution among the misclassification rates.  Second, the penalties for false positive 
predictions are the same as false negative predictions even though false negatives are less 
desirable.  For example, Diagnostic Events—which classify every record as benign—
achieve a lower misclassification rate than all but two of the models due to their higher 
false positive rates.  Thus, we use the ratio of detection rates to false positive rates to 








Table 5.   The green to red trends indicate relative goodness of the variable group statistics 
in the context of ordinal logistic regression.  The best performing individual group 
is IP Stats and the best combination of groups is the IP Stats and IDS predictions.  
The negative contribution of the Diagnostic Event variables individually and as an 
addition to the others in a logistic regression model is made clear by the drop in 
performance in the far right column. 
Logistic Regression Statistics Using Ordinal Response Variable 
 
Table 6.   Similar to Table 5, the results from the same modeling techniques applied to a 
binary response variable show marginal benefits in false positive rate.  The basic 
trends remain consistent, however.  IP Stats and IDS predictions are the best 
group combination. 

















Chi2 4.52 138.57 812.58 142.48 812.58 882.81 882.81
‐LL Difference 2.26 69.28 406.29 71.24 406.29 441.41 441.41
RMSE 0.0993 0.0860 0.0917 0.0860 0.2638 0.0891 0.0897
AIC 952.06 822.02 160.04 824.12 174.09 99.85 113.91
N(validation) 10890 10890 10890 10890 10890 10890 10890
Misclassification Rate
Training 0.0062 0.0054 0.0016 0.0054 0.0017 0.0004 0.0004
Validation 0.0099 0.0074 0.0102 0.0074 0.0716 0.0092 0.0093
Validation Performance
True Positives 0 27 65 27 65 75 74
True Negatives 10890 10863 10759 10863 10090 10749 10750
False Positives 0 0 66 0 735 66 66
False Negatives 98 71 33 71 33 23 24
Intrusion Detection% 0.0000 0.2755 0.6633 0.2755 0.6633 0.7653 0.7551
False Positive % 0.0000 0.0000 0.0061 0.0000 0.0681 0.0061 0.0061
Overall Accuracy % 1.0000 1.0000 0.9939 1.0000 0.9325 0.9939 0.9939


















Chi2 4.52 102.98 835.26 106.86 798.45 847.19 847.19
‐LL Difference 4.52 51.47 417.63 53.43 399.22 423.60 423.60
RMSE 0.0944 0.0805 0.0890 0.0804 0.3686 0.0827 0.0891
AIC 910.43 801.99 95.72 812.09 146.58 87.80 101.86
N(validation) 10890 10890 10890 10890 10890 10890 10890
Misclass Rate
Training 0.0062 0.0054 0.0013 0.0054 0.0015 0.0004 0.0004
Validation 0.0090 0.0065 0.0092 0.0065 0.1378 0.0081 0.0094
Validation Performance
True Positives 0 27 67 27 64 75 75
True Negatives 10890 10863 10754 10863 9359 10750 10736
False Positives 0 0 69 0 1467 65 79
False Negatives 98 71 31 71 34 23 23
Detection% 0.0000 0.2755 0.6837 0.2755 0.6531 0.7653 0.7653
False Pos% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0064 0.0000 0.1359 0.0060 0.0073
Overall Accuracy % 1.0000 1.0000 0.9937 1.0000 0.8653 0.9940 0.9927
Detection%/False Pos% 0.00 0.00 106.93 0.00 4.80 127.06 104.55
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Although Diagnostic Events as a group showed poor results, we considered that 
individual variables within the group may have some significance in the presence of 
variables from the other groups.  To investigate this possibility as well as whether a better 
model could be achieved with a mix of variables from each of the three variable groups, 
we began with a full first order logistic regression model and conducted backwards 
elimination.  We eliminated variables one at a time based on their individual performance 
in the presence of the other variables.   
The variable elimination criteria were as follows: variables with = 0 were 
eliminated, then those with Standard Error = 0, followed by those with the least 
significant chi-squared (2) statistics. After eliminating each variable, the resulting model 
performance was checked using a validation set.  The process was stopped when the 


















A. ORDINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS: MIXED MODEL 
Ultimately, the Diagnostic Event variables were eliminated early and were not 
included in the final model, however a combination of IP Conversation Statistics and IDS 
Tool Predictions did yield an improved model.  It should be noted here that the process 
was repeated with the Source Port and Destination Port variables coded as ordinal as well 
as categorical.  Although categorical coding of the port numbers is more appropriate, 
JMP’s ordinal logistic regression algorithm would only converge with them coded as 
ordinal.  Ultimately, both port variables were eliminated, but an argument could be made 
on behalf of the advantages of each coding method.   
Table 7 shows the progression of the elimination steps.  We use minimum AICc 
as a stopping rule to identify a suitable model that avoids over-fitting.  In the several runs 
we attempted, using different variable coding methods, we noted that although the model 
resulting with the step after minimum AICc occurs was typically an improvement in 
prediction performance, it was usually also accompanied by a sharp increase in AICc, 
thus suggesting the improvement was due to over-fitting.  The parameters we eliminated 
in the final model are listed below in the order of their elimination: 
Step 1: NumberSecurity (Diagnostic Event) 
Step 2: NumberFault (Diagnostic Event) 
Step 3: Duration (IP Conversation Statistics) 
Step 4: NumberInfomation (Diagnostic Event)  
Step 5: NumberNotices (Diagnostic Event) 
Step 6: NumberPerformance (Diagnostic Event) 
Step 7: Packets Received (IP Conversation Statistics) 
Step 8: Bytes Received (IP Conversation Statistics) 
Step 9: NumberAlarms (Diagnostic Event) 
Step 10: Number of Diagnostic Events (Diagnostic Event) 
Step 11: Dragon (IDS Prediction) 
Step 12: Protocol (IP Conversation Statistic) 
*Step 13: Bytes (IP Conversation Statistic) 
*Step 14: Packets (IP Conversation Statistic) 
 







Table 7.   At the 11th and 12th steps, the model reaches its minimum AICc  
(the stopping rule).  After the 12th step, performance against the training set 
declines.  Each of the four previous models (9-12) performs statistically similarly 
on the training set, so using AICc as the stopping criterion minimizes the 
likelihood of an over-fit model.  The performance statistics at the bottom show 
that the same four models return identical results up to the 12th step.   
Beyond the 14th step, the model fails to converge. 
Stepwise Model Statistics and Training Set Performance 
   VARIABLE ELIMINATION STEPS 
  Full  1  …  10  11  12  13*  14* 
ChiSquare  835.25  835.25  835.25  835.25  835.25  835.25  788.27  788.27 
RSquare  0.9291  0.9291  0.9291  0.9291  0.9291  0.9291  0.8769  0.8769 
Entropy R^2  ‐0.073  ‐0.023  0.1876  0.1844  0.1771  0.1746  0.4547  0.45 
Generalized R^2  ‐0.078  ‐0.024  0.1955  0.1922  0.1847  0.1821  0.4671  0.4627 
Mean ‐Log p  0.0551  0.0551  0.0417  0.0419  0.0423  0.0424  0.028  0.0282 
RMSE  0.0843  0.0843  0.0757  0.0757  0.0757  0.076  0.0723  0.0719 
‐Loglikelihood Difference  417.62  417.62  417.62  417.62  417.62  417.62  394.14  394.14 
AICc  109.78  105.77  93.73  91.73  89.72  87.72  122.67  118.67 
BIC  279.46  260.69  204.41  195.03  185.65  176.26  166.95  148.19 
Mean Abs. Dev.  0.0089  0.0089  0.0076  0.0076  0.0076  0.0076  0.0077  0.0076 
Training Observations  11862  11862  11862  11862  11862  11862  11862  11862 
Total Detections  89  89  89  89  89  89  101  101 
True Positives  74  74  74  74  74  74  74  74 
True Negatives  11773  11773  11773  11773  11773  11773  11761  11761 
False Positives  15  15  15  15  15  15  27  27 
False Negatives  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Detection %  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 












Table 8.   The 13th step returns the best predictive value because it is over-fit.   
The 12th step has sufficient accuracy and detection rates, with better protection 
against over-fitting. 
Stepwise Model Test Set Performance 
   VARIABLE ELIMINATION STEPS 
   Full  1  …  10  11  12  13  14 
    
Validation Observations  10890  10890  10890  10890  10890  10890  10890  10890 
Total Detections  163  163  150  150  150  149  156  151 
True Positives  81  81  82  82  82  81  83  81 
True Negatives  10710  10710  10724  10724  10724  10724  10727  10722 
False Positives  82  82  68  68  68  68  73  70 
False Negatives  17  17  16  16  16  17  15  17 
Detection %  82.65  82.65  83.67  83.67  83.67  82.65  84.69  82.65 
Accuracy %  99.09  99.09  99.23  99.23  99.23  99.22  99.27  99.2 
 
Table 9.   Final ordinal regression model parameters and their estimates. High 
multicollinearity among the variables means that many variable combinations can 
combine to make comparably good models, but results in high standard errors and 
low significance among the predictor variables.   
Mixed Ordinal Regression Model Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate () Std Error ChiSquare (2) Prob>ChiSq 
Intercept [0] -18.772168 2568.1529 0 .9942 
Bytes -75.588597 15281.839 0 .9961 
Bytes Sent 28.2899936 7037.365 0 .9968 
Packets 103.856275 21718.97 0 .9962 
Packets Sent -83.156536 19618.83 0 .9966 
SNORT 2.1.2 -934.5543 182404.1 0 .9959 
 
Ultimately, high multicollinearity among the variables means that many variable 
combinations can combine to make comparably good models.  For example, an 
alternative method of eliminating variables in order of their standard errors (from high to 
low) results in models of similar fit and predictive quality, but standard errors of zero and 
Chi-Square statistics of 10,000 (which is the default value the JMP software enters rather 
than “undefined” due to the zero value in the denominator of the Chi-Square calculation). 
Because we suspect these regression results are due to highly correlated predictor 
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variables, and that this is due to the lack of sophistication of the predictor variables, we 
apply the same method to the 1999 KDD Cup dataset in the next section in order to test 
whether more sophisticated predictor variables result in a logistic regression model that is 
both sufficiently predictive and significant. 
To evaluate our predictive performance among the different categories of activity, 
we fit a new logistic regression using the same five predictor variables, but instead of 
using a binary response variable (0=Benign, 1=Malicious), we partitioned the response 
variable into its five ordinal categories to show clearly how well the model predicts each 
one.  The ability to correctly predict normal (Benign) conversations is quite good, with 
99.33% of normal conversations accurately predicted.  Background Scanner 
conversations, which were confused with either Benign or Attacker conversations, were 
the most misclassified, at 72.94% accuracy.  As the next section will describe, these are 
strong results when compared against the KDD-99 competition results. 
Table 10.   Confusion matrix results of ordinal logistic regression versus the Skaion test 
dataset. The bottom marginal values show the percentage of correct predictions 
made for that column (i.e., 99.77% of the “normal” predictions were actually 
“normal”).  The marginal percentages on the right show the percentage of each 
category that were correctly identified (i.e., 99.33% of “normal” connections were 
predicted correctly). It is also interesting to note that the model correctly filters 
chaff from the categories of records that require further inspection.  This occurs 
despite 1) the Chaff connections were designed to mimic the Attacker’s signature 
in order to mask the Attacker’s origin, and 2) there is no chaff in the training 
dataset so that the model can define it. 
Skaion Ordinal Logistic Regression Model (Test Set) 








Benign (0)  10710  0 72 0 0  99.33% 
Chaff (1)  10  0 0 0 0  0.00% 
Bkgrd Scan (2)  13  0 62 0 10  72.94% 
Bkgrd Atk (3)  2  0 0 9 0  81.82% 
Attacker (4)  0  0 0 0 2  100.00% 
99.77%  0.00%  46.27%  100.00%  16.67% 
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Table 11.   The winning results score (or “cost”) 0.2331 per observation.  The bottom 
marginal values show the percentage of correct predictions made for that column 
(i.e., 74.61% of the “normal” predictions were actually “normal”).  The marginal 
percentages on the right show the percentage of each category that were correctly 
identified (i.e., 99.45% of “normal” connections were predicted correctly). 
From  [19]  
1999 KDD Cup Winning Results (Based on Training Dataset) 
  PREDICTED           
ACTUAL  0  1  2  3  4 
0  60262  243 78 4 6  99.45% 
1  511  3471 184 0 0  83.32% 
2  5299  1328 223226 0 0  97.12% 
3  168  20 0 30 10  13.16% 
4  14527  294 0 8 1360  8.40% 
74.61%  64.81% 99.88% 71.43% 98.84% 
 
It is worth noting that the results posted on the KDD Cup results web page report 
performance against the training set only.  To compare the performance of nominal 
logistic regression against that of the 1999 KDD Cup winner in the next section, we 
report performance against both the training set (Table 14) and the test set (Table 15).   
B. KDD-99: VALIDATION OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION AS A 
CLASSIFIER  
1. KDD-Cup Scoring Method 
The competition participants were scored relative to one another based on the 
application of the cost entries in Table 12 to each misclassification made by the fitted 
models and divided the sum by the total number of observations (311,029) to achieve an 
average cost per observation.  The scores range from the winning score of 0.233 to 
0.9414.  The distribution of the results among the 24 participants is shown in Table 13.   
The winner of the 1999 KDD Cup, Bernhard Pfahringer of the Austrian Research 
Institute for Artificial Intelligence, achieved the results shown in Table 11 using decision 
trees with bagging and boosting [21].  The different modeling techniques used by the 
participants resulted in narrow margins of performance among the top 17 performers, but 
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it is worth noting within the results that 8th best submission used a simple 1-nearest 
neighbor classifier to achieve a score of 0.2523 [19]. 
 
Table 12.   The 1999 KDD Cup competition categorized attacks based on type, similar to our 
method.  The values in this matrix are multiplied by each number in the 
classification matrices used to report predictions.  The objective is to minimize 
the cost incurred by making correct predictions, thus maximizing the sum along 
the diagonal so that no cost is incurred. The cost matrix establishes penalties such 
that the overall cost (or score) for classifying every observation as “probe” is 
approximately 1.0, provided categories U2R (3) and R2L (4) are relatively rare. 
From [19]  
 
Table 13.   KDD Cup Participant Scores. The results varied widely, with a mean=0.3114, 
median=0.2548 and standard deviation=0.1468.  The best 17 submissions all 
performed well, and final 7 submissions (scores of 0.2952 and greater) are 
considered inferior. From [19] 
1999 KDD Cup Cost Matrix 
PREDICTED 
ACTUAL  normal (0)  probe (1)  DOS (2)  U2R (3)  R2L (4) 
normal (0)  0 1 2 2  2 
probe (1)  1 0 2 2  2 
DOS (2)  2 1 0 2  2 
U2R (3)  3 2 2 0  2 
R2L (4)  4 2 2 2  0 
KDD Cup Participant Scores 
0.2331 (Winner)  0.2474 0.2552 0.3344 
0.2356  0.2479 0.2575 0.3767 
0.2367  0.2523 0.2588 0.3854 
0.2411  0.253 0.2644 0.3899 
0.2414  0.2531 0.2684 0.5053 
0.2443  0.2545 0.2952 0.9414 
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2. Logistic Regression Performance on the KDD-99 Dataset 
While the previous comparison of our logistic regression results with the Skaion 
dataset against the results of the 1999 KDD Cup showed better performance, we 
determine the comparison to be biased for two main reasons: 1) our response variable 
categories are much broader, and 2) our dataset is far less dense with attacks.  
Additionally, the Chi-Squared statistics of the variables within the model were not 
significant. 
To show the strength of logistic regression as a classifier, we used a similar 
backwards variable elimination process to determine a good logistic regression fit of the 
KDD-99 data.  Because the KDD-99 dataset had such a large number of variables, we 
first divided the variables into four different models.  Three of the sets were divided per 
the three feature categories described in the online task descriptions (see Appendix B), 
and the remaining variables comprised the fourth model.  Significant variables from each 
model were chosen to be included in the “full” model of 34 variables.  This model was 
then used to run backwards stepwise regression, using AICc as a stopping rule.  
The regression model parameters from our resulting best model, provided in 
Table 14, show that the significance of the KDD-99 predictor variables is much higher 
than those we chose for the Skaion dataset.  This both highlights the importance of 




Table 14.   Nominal logistic regression model parameters for the KDD-99 dataset show that the significance of the variables  
is improved dramatically over those of the Skaion dataset. 
Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Intercept 16.618 1.3675 147.66 <.0001 ‐4.3042 1.418 9.21 0.0024 ‐4.9307 1.3866 12.64 0.0004 7.7133 3.6772 4.4 0.0359
count 0.0025 0.0111 0.05 0.8207 0.0091 0.0111 0.68 0.4098 0.0108 0.0111 0.94 0.3316 ‐0.0514 0.085 0.37 0.5454
srv_count 0.3648 0.0138 694.88 <.0001 0.3514 0.0139 639.36 <.0001 0.3568 0.0138 664.67 <.0001 0.3046 0.0753 16.37 <.0001
serror_rate ‐3.7385 11.226 0.11 0.7391 ‐0.8053 11.231 0.01 0.9428 7.2828 11.24 0.42 0.517 ‐225.24 137743 0 0.9987
srv_serror_rate 4.8322 11.237 0.18 0.6672 5.5038 11.242 0.24 0.6244 ‐2.4976 11.251 0.05 0.8243 ‐237.95 184245 0 0.999
rerror_rate ‐1.2876 0.6274 4.21 0.0401 4.6953 0.7056 44.28 <.0001 9.9407 0.7789 162.88 <.0001 ‐63.878 69489 0 0.9993
srv_rerror_rate ‐0.0043 0.6861 0 0.995 ‐1.8642 0.8768 4.52 0.0335 ‐8.518 0.8362 103.78 <.0001 ‐156.98 100343 0 0.9988
same_srv_rate ‐10.008 1.3228 57.24 <.0001 0.3431 1.3329 0.07 0.7969 ‐6.9594 1.3278 27.47 <.0001 ‐7.4418 3.5321 4.44 0.0351
diff_srv_rate ‐4.1345 0.693 35.6 <.0001 7.6566 0.7308 109.77 <.0001 ‐5.0916 0.7438 46.86 <.0001 ‐6.3973 3.4364 3.47 0.0627
srv_diff_host_rate 6.5204 0.4053 258.77 <.0001 9.2252 0.4645 394.49 <.0001 ‐0.3839 0.4516 0.72 0.3953 2.9911 0.9283 10.38 0.0013
dst_host_count ‐0.0285 0.001 858.91 <.0001 ‐0.0179 0.0014 153.51 <.0001 0.0168 0.0012 209.42 <.0001 ‐0.0154 0.0025 39.08 <.0001
dst_host_srv_count 0.027 0.0011 583.1 <.0001 0.037 0.002 359.75 <.0001 ‐0.002 0.0013 2.32 0.1277 ‐0.0118 0.0047 6.34 0.0118
dst_host_same_srv_rate ‐6.8489 0.2835 583.67 <.0001 ‐13.768 0.5573 610.43 <.0001 3.2142 0.3731 74.22 <.0001 ‐6.1091 0.7469 66.91 <.0001
dst_host_diff_srv_rate 17.113 1.0968 243.42 <.0001 17.61 1.1379 239.5 <.0001 17.239 1.1168 238.25 <.0001 18.875 1.3552 194 <.0001
dst_host_same_src_port_rate 2.4641 0.282 76.34 <.0001 12.923 0.3979 1054.7 <.0001 11.905 0.2984 1592.1 <.0001 5.144 0.6859 56.25 <.0001
dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate ‐0.7625 1.1369 0.45 0.5024 14.152 1.2364 131.01 <.0001 6.5764 1.1932 30.38 <.0001 2.7699 1.4038 3.89 0.0485
dst_host_serror_rate 7.5285 3.1889 5.57 0.0182 13.729 3.2349 18.01 <.0001 13.187 3.1904 17.08 <.0001 9.8995 3.2412 9.33 0.0023
dst_host_srv_serror_rate ‐0.611 2.8998 0.04 0.8331 10.766 2.956 13.26 0.0003 11.595 2.8926 16.07 <.0001 6.5888 3.0899 4.55 0.033
dst_host_rerror_rate ‐4.203 0.4852 75.04 <.0001 5.195 0.5351 94.27 <.0001 8.5551 0.5149 276.07 <.0001 ‐2.5496 1.1112 5.26 0.0218
dst_host_srv_rerror_rate ‐3.7988 0.445 72.89 <.0001 ‐0.3508 0.7167 0.24 0.6245 ‐2.7576 0.5346 26.61 <.0001 1.0217 0.9286 1.21 0.2712
logged_in 0.256 0.0275 86.95 <.0001 ‐2.8125 0.3687 58.19 <.0001 3.6662 0.0712 2654.8 <.0001 2.4158 0.3253 55.15 <.0001
is_guest_login ‐2.9538 0.1857 253.04 <.0001 ‐23.214 187745 0 0.9999 4.5302 0.1936 547.36 <.0001 ‐2.7602 0.6608 17.45 <.0001
num_file_creations 1.9007 0.8664 4.81 0.0282 ‐22.457 234978 0 0.9999 ‐4.0126 1.2211 10.8 0.001 1.9221 0.8665 4.92 0.0265
is_host_login ‐7.2283 1.4508 24.82 <.0001 ‐28.581 1E+06 0 1 ‐6.7878 1.5003 20.47 <.0001 ‐2.3971 1.2229 3.84 0.05
Log Odds for 0/4 Log Odds for 1/4 Log Odds for 2/4 Log Odds for 3/4
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As with the Skaion dataset, we attempted both nominal and ordinal logistic 
regression, and in the case of KDD-99 we found nominal coding of the response 
variables led to earlier convergence of the model (i.e., model converged after fewer 
variable elimination steps).  Our results against the training set, shown in Table 15, 
represent a 7.8% improvement over the winning results.  Our performance against the test 
dataset, shown in Table 16, represents a 66.8% improvement over the winner’s training 
set results.  Again, because the test set results were not posted, we can only compare 
against the winner’s training set.   
Table 15.   Cost score using the 1999 KDD Cup cost matrix on results of ordinal logistic 
regression versus the KDD Cup training dataset is 0.2150 (7.8% lower than the 
winning score of 0.2331). 
Nominal Logistic Regression Results vs.  
1999 KDD Cup Training Dataset 
  PREDICTED           
ACTUAL  0  1  2  3  4 
0  50997  189 1338 4 8065  84.16% 
1  159  3890 104 0 13  93.37% 
2  5490  100 225814 0 51  97.56% 
3  2  0 15 17 4  44.74% 
4  9043  0 36 4 5644  38.32% 





























Table 16.   Cost score using the 1999 KDD Cup cost matrix on results of ordinal logistic 
regression versus the KDD Cup test dataset is 0.0774.  Again, we cannot compare 





  PREDICTED           
ACTUAL  0  1  2  3  4 
0  78249  9118 3085 47 6779 80.44% 
1  124  3674 301 0 8 89.46% 
2  2679  333 388278 0 188 99.18% 
3  32  0 22 3 4 4.92% 
4  62  1 1033 1 0 0.00% 
96.43%  27.99% 98.87% 5.88% 0.00%
  41
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Individual Tools and Methods are Inadequate by Themselves 
There are many approaches to both signature and anomaly detection in network 
security.  Each category and each tool have their strengths and weaknesses and all must 
be responsive to the dynamic nature of the threat.  Since requiring analysts to continue 
stacking detection tools or rule sets indefinitely is untenable, methods of combining 
responses generated by these tools should be used to help streamline analysis.  Our 
method showed the merits of one approach which drastically improved the predictive 
performance of an intrusion detection tool and basic IP conversation statistics. 
Furthermore, no tool or method we studied was 100% effective against all threats.  
Although ranking methods can help prioritize investigation of more immediate or more 
dangerous known threats, it will do nothing to protect against unknown threats (novel or 
zero-day attacks).  Thus, learning systems that adjust their definition of “normal” and 
take into account network environment statistics should be improved.  Good examples of 
these types of systems fall under the anomaly detection category. 
2. With Good Predictors, Simple Methods Can Be Very Powerful 
Our classification of the Skaion dataset’s threats was accomplished with an 
elementary set of significantly collinear predictor variables, yet they performed 
comparatively well in a logistic regression.  The validation of that performance against a 
much more complex dataset was due to the high quality of the predictor variables 
available in that dataset, which were more contextual and more independent than those 
we chose for Skaion.  Of course, balance must be sought between the goals of 
constructing powerful predictor variables and minimizing the computational overhead 
associated with their construction. 
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3. Experimental Network Design Needs to Consider Analysis 
One of the most important findings on which we can report from this study is the 
difficulty associated with data exploration in this field.  First, the amount of data 
available in even a simple scenario conducted over a short period of time can be difficult 
to manage.  Second, understanding the context of the data can be problematic for those 
unfamiliar with network design and security.  Third, even with that background 
knowledge, the ground truth must be both detailed and clear in order to avoid wasting 
analysis opportunities and making false assumptions. 
The Skaion dataset was created using novel methods of network traffic generation 
and emulation while maintaining data anonymity, which is crucial to its academic utility.  
Unfortunately, due to imprecise labeling, disorganized file structure, and lack of 
preprocessing, that utility is inaccessible to analysts without a strong computer science 
background. Conversely, the 1999 KDD Cup dataset was presented to participants with 
enough pre-processing complete that statisticians and data miners who were not computer 
scientists were able to participate.  Although it has its own shortcomings [16], this 
accessibility is why that dataset is still used as an industry standard for academic study. 
 We recommend that network emulators create a set of companion files based on 
their scenarios that provide analysis opportunities similar to the 1999 KDD Cup dataset.  
The types of predictor variables could be identical, or they could add more that they have 
found to be good performers.  While the raw data is valuable, there are many dimensions 
to the network security problem that do not require getting down to a deep packet 
inspection level. 
Additionally, Skaion should add more intrusion detection predictions similar to 
the four they include, but that vary more in their responses.  The intent should be to 
simulate the data overload an analyst might experience from having too many inputs to 
analyze in a reasonable amount of time in order to allow study on how to compress those 
incoming signals to minimize duplication of effort on common events while maintaining 
enough resolution to detect rare events.  These classic signal-to-noise ratio problems are 
fertile ground for human system interface, data visualization, and data mining analysts of 
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all flavors, many of whom may not have the computer science background necessary to 
“break the code” of the Skaion data set’s file system. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
1. Further Exploitation of the Skaion Dataset 
Since we feel we have only scratched the surface of what the Skaion dataset has 
to offer, we recommend that further effort be made to extract better predictor variables in 
order to test more robust methods.  Our desire to work primarily in a Microsoft Windows 
environment limited full assimilation of the ground truth and network flow data included 
in the dataset.  Being able to manipulate this data using the Unix programs for which they 
were intended would have allowed us two advantages: 
1. Variables created from the IDS tool alert logs could be matched to 
each individual conversation, as opposed to just their predictions of 
IP address role, as we used them; 
2. Network flow statistics could be accessed and new variables 
created. 
This work would require either an analyst with a network security background, or 
collaboration with the Skaion Corporation to accomplish the necessary pre-processing of 
the dataset. 
2. Use the 1999 KDD Cup Dataset to Test Better Data Fusion Methods 
The accessibility of the 1999 KDD Cup dataset makes it a perfect candidate as a 
foundation for testing new modeling techniques.  Since the competition occurred over 13 
years ago, the remaining opportunities for first-order detection models are probably few.  
However, since data visualization and fusion are perhaps an even bigger challenge now 
due to the increased complexity and sophistication of the threat, opportunities here may 
actually be increasing.  Using the KDD Cup dataset as a backdrop, and multiple intrusion 
detection systems of varied detection abilities, more work could be done to improve 
prioritization of threat response as well as optimize both computational and analytical 
workload involved with intrusion detection. 
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APPENDICES 
A. MACROS USED TO SORT AND CLEAN EXPORTED PACKET DATA 
The following Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) code was implemented with 
Microsoft Excel to pre-sort and clean the raw data. The runtime to process a dataset of 




' AddErrorlClassColumns Macro 




    Sheets(“Error Key”).Select 
    Range(“A2:A22”).Select 
    Selection.Copy 
    Sheets(“IP Stats”).Select 
    Range(“AH1”).Select 
    Selection.PasteSpecial Paste:=xlPasteAll, Operation:=xlNone, SkipBlanks:= _ 
        False, Transpose:=True 
    Columns(“A:A”).EntireColumn.AutoFit 
    Columns(“B:B”).EntireColumn.AutoFit 
    ActiveWindow.SmallScroll Down:=96 
    Columns(“B:B”).Select 
    Application.CutCopyMode = False 
    Selection.ClearContents 
    Range(“B1”).Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = “IP Classification” 









    Selection.AutoFilter 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = “=IF(RC[12]=0,0,1)” 
    Range(“B2”).Select 
    Selection.AutoFill Destination:=Range(“B2:B2270”), Type:=xlFillDefault 
    Range(“B2:B2270”).Select 
     
    Range(“BC1”).Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = “Country” 
    Range(“BC3”).Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = “N/A” 
    Range(“BC4”).Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = “=IF(RC[-53]=1,R[-1]C,IF(RC[-53]=0,RC[-54]))” 
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    Range(“BC4”).Select 
    Selection.AutoFill Destination:=Range(“BC4:BC972”), Type:=xlFillDefault 
    Range(“BC4:BC972”).Select 
    Selection.AutoFill Destination:=Range(“BC4:BC2270”), Type:=xlFillDefault 
    Range(“BC4:BC2270”).Select 
     
    Range(“E25”).Select 
    Columns(“BC:BC”).Select 
    Selection.Copy 
    Columns(“BD:BD”).Select 
    Selection.PasteSpecial Paste:=xlPasteValues, Operation:=xlNone, SkipBlanks _ 
        :=False, Transpose:=False 
    Columns(“BC:BC”).Select 
    Application.CutCopyMode = False 
     
    Rows(“1:1”).Select 
    ActiveWorkbook.Worksheets(“IP Stats”).AutoFilter.Sort.SortFields. _ 
        Clear 
    ActiveWorkbook.Worksheets(“IP Stats”).AutoFilter.Sort.SortFields. _ 
        Add Key:=Range(“B1”), SortOn:=xlSortOnValues, Order:=xlDescending, _ 
        DataOption:=xlSortTextAsNumbers 
    With ActiveWorkbook.Worksheets(“IP Stats”).AutoFilter.Sort 
        .Header = xlYes 
        .MatchCase = False 
        .Orientation = xlTopToBottom 
        .SortMethod = xlPinYin 
        .Apply 
    End With 





' FillErrorClassCols Macro 




    Range(“B2”).Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = “=LOOKUP(RC[-1],'ip-key'!C[-1],'ip-key'!C)” 
    Range(“B2”).Select 
    Selection.AutoFill Destination:=Range(“B2:B2390”), Type:=xlFillDefault 
    Range(“AH2”).Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = _ 
        “=COUNTIFS('Diagnosis Events'!C7,'IP Stats'!RC1,'Diagnosis Events'!C1,'IP 
Stats'!R1C)” 
    Range(“AH2”).Select 
    Selection.AutoFill Destination:=Range(“AH2:BB2”), Type:=xlFillDefault 
    Range(“AH2:BB2”).Select 
    Range(“AH2:BB2”).Select 
    Range(“BB2”).Activate 
    Selection.AutoFill Destination:=Range(“AH2:BB2439”), Type:=xlFillDefault 
    Range(“AH2:BB2439”).Select 
    Range(“AW2439”).Select 
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    Application.Calculation = xlManual 
    Range(“A1”).Select 
     
    Sheets.Add After:=Sheets(Sheets.Count) 
    Sheets(“IP Stats”).Select 
    Range(“A1:BC2439”).Select 
    Range(“A1753”).Activate 
    Selection.Copy 
    Sheets(“Sheet4”).Select 
    Range(“A1”).Select 
    Selection.PasteSpecial Paste:=xlPasteValues, Operation:=xlNone, SkipBlanks _ 
        :=False, Transpose:=False 
    Sheets(“IP Stats”).Select 
    Application.CutCopyMode = False 
    ActiveWindow.SelectedSheets.Delete 
    Application.Calculation = xlAutomatic 





' DeleteExtraDataTags Macro 




    Columns(“C:C”).Select 
    Selection.TextToColumns Destination:=Range(“C1”), DataType:=xlDelimited, _ 
        TextQualifier:=xlDoubleQuote, ConsecutiveDelimiter:=True, Tab:=False, _ 
        Semicolon:=False, Comma:=False, Space:=True, Other:=False, FieldInfo _ 
        :=Array(Array(1, 1), Array(2, 9)), TrailingMinusNumbers:=True 
    Columns(“E:E”).Select 
    Selection.TextToColumns Destination:=Range(“E1”), DataType:=xlDelimited, _ 
        TextQualifier:=xlDoubleQuote, ConsecutiveDelimiter:=True, Tab:=False, _ 
        Semicolon:=False, Comma:=False, Space:=True, Other:=False, FieldInfo _ 
        :=Array(Array(1, 1), Array(2, 9), Array(3, 9)), 
TrailingMinusNumbers:=True 
    Columns(“F:F”).Select 
    Selection.TextToColumns Destination:=Range(“F1”), DataType:=xlDelimited, _ 
        TextQualifier:=xlDoubleQuote, ConsecutiveDelimiter:=True, Tab:=False, _ 
        Semicolon:=False, Comma:=False, Space:=True, Other:=False, FieldInfo _ 
        :=Array(Array(1, 1), Array(2, 9), Array(3, 9)), 
TrailingMinusNumbers:=True 
    Columns(“H:H”).Select 
    Selection.TextToColumns Destination:=Range(“H1”), DataType:=xlDelimited, _ 
        TextQualifier:=xlDoubleQuote, ConsecutiveDelimiter:=True, Tab:=False, _ 
        Semicolon:=False, Comma:=False, Space:=True, Other:=False, FieldInfo _ 
        :=Array(Array(1, 1), Array(2, 9)), TrailingMinusNumbers:=True 
    Columns(“J:J”).Select 
    Selection.TextToColumns Destination:=Range(“J1”), DataType:=xlDelimited, _ 
        TextQualifier:=xlDoubleQuote, ConsecutiveDelimiter:=True, Tab:=False, _ 
        Semicolon:=False, Comma:=False, Space:=True, Other:=False, FieldInfo _ 
        :=Array(Array(1, 1), Array(2, 9)), TrailingMinusNumbers:=True 
    Columns(“C:J”).Select 
    Columns(“C:J”).EntireColumn.AutoFit 
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    Range(“C1”).Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = “Kilobytes” 
    Range(“E1”).Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = “Kilobits Per Second” 
    Range(“F1”).Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = “Kilobytes Per Second” 
    Range(“H1”).Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = “Kilobytes Received” 
    Range(“J1”).Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = “Kilobytes Sent” 








    Columns(“C:C”).Select 
    Selection.Insert Shift:=xlToRight, CopyOrigin:=xlFormatFromLeftOrAbove 
    Columns(“D:D”).Select 
    Selection.Insert Shift:=xlToRight, CopyOrigin:=xlFormatFromLeftOrAbove 
    Range(“C1”).Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = “Binary IP Classification” 
    Range(“D1”).Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = “Ordinal IP Classification” 
    Range(“C2”).Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = _ 
        “=IF(RC[-1]=““ATTACKER”“,1,IF(RC[-1]=““BACKGROUND ATTACKER”“,1,IF(RC[-
1]=““BACKGROUND SCANNER”“,1,0)))” 
    Range(“C2”).Select 
    Selection.Copy 
    Range(“C2”).Select 
    Range(Selection, Selection.End(xlDown)).Select 
    Application.CutCopyMode = False 
    Selection.FillDown 
    Range(“D2”).Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = _ 
        “=IF(RC[-2]=““VICTIM”“,0,IF(RC[-2]=““SERVER”“,0,IF(RC[-
2]=““CLIENT”“,0,IF(RC[-2]=““BACKGROUND SCANNER”“,1,IF(RC[-2]=““BACKGROUND 
ATTACKER”“,2,IF(RC[-2]=““ATTACKER”“,3,0))))))” 
    Range(“D2”).Select 
    Selection.Copy 
    Range(Selection, Selection.End(xlDown)).Select 
    Application.CutCopyMode = False 
    Selection.FillDown 
    Range(“A1”).Select 








B. KDD CUP 1999 DATASET DETAILS (FROM THE KDD-CUP 1999 
WEBPAGE)[19]  
This document is adapted from the paper Cost-based Modeling and Evaluation 
for Data Mining With Application to Fraud and Intrusion Detection: Results from the 
JAM Project by Salvatore J. Stolfo, Wei Fan, Wenke Lee, Andreas Prodromidis, and 
Philip K. Chan. 
1. INTRUSION DETECTOR LEARNING 
Software to detect network intrusions protects a computer network from 
unauthorized users, including perhaps insiders.  The intrusion detector learning task is to 
build a predictive model (i.e., a classifier) capable of distinguishing between ``bad'' 
connections, called intrusions or attacks, and ``good'' normal connections.  
 
The 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program was prepared and 
managed by MIT Lincoln Labs. The objective was to survey and evaluate research in 
intrusion detection.  A standard set of data to be audited, which includes a wide variety of 
intrusions simulated in a military network environment, was provided.  The 1999 KDD 
intrusion detection contest uses a version of this dataset.  
 
Lincoln Labs set up an environment to acquire nine weeks of raw TCP dump data 
for a local-area network (LAN) simulating a typical U.S. Air Force LAN.  They operated 
the LAN as if it were a true Air Force environment, but peppered it with multiple attacks.  
 
The raw training data was about four gigabytes of compressed binary TCP dump 
data from seven weeks of network traffic.  This was processed into about five million 
connection records.  Similarly, the two weeks of test data yielded around two million 
connection records.  
 
A connection is a sequence of TCP packets starting and ending at some well-
defined times, between which data flows to and from a source IP address to a target IP 
address under some well-defined protocol.  Each connection is labeled as either normal, 
or as an attack, with exactly one specific attack type.  Each connection record consists of 
about 100 bytes.  
 
Attacks fall into four main categories:  
  DOS: denial-of-service, e.g. syn flood; 
 R2L: unauthorized access from a remote machine, e.g. guessing 
password; 
 U2R:  unauthorized access to local superuser (root) privileges, e.g., 
various ``buffer overflow'' attacks; 
   Probing: surveillance and other probing, e.g., port scanning. 
 
It is important to note that the test data is not from the same probability 
distribution as the training data, and it includes specific attack types not in the training 
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data.  This makes the task more realistic.  Some intrusion experts believe that most novel 
attacks are variants of known attacks and the “signature” of known attacks can be 
sufficient to catch novel variants.  The datasets contain a total of 24 training attack types, 
with an additional 14 types in the test data only.  
 
2. DERIVED FEATURES 
  Stolfo et al. defined higher-level features that help in distinguishing normal 
connections from attacks.  There are several categories of derived features.  
 
The ``same host'' features examine only the connections in the past two seconds 
that have the same destination host as the current connection, and calculate statistics 
related to protocol behavior, service, etc.  
 
The similar ``same service'' features examine only the connections in the past two 
seconds that have the same service as the current connection.  
 
“Same host” and “same service” features are together called  time-based traffic 
features of the connection records.  
 
Some probing attacks scan the hosts (or ports) using a much larger time interval 
than two seconds, for example once per minute.  Therefore, connection records were also 
sorted by destination host, and features were constructed using a window of 100 
connections to the same host instead of a time window.  This yields a set of so-called 
host-based traffic features.  
 
Unlike most of the DOS and probing attacks, there appear to be no sequential 
patterns that are frequent in records of R2L and U2R attacks. This is because the DOS 
and probing attacks involve many connections to some host(s) in a very short period of 
time, but the R2L and U2R attacks are embedded in the data portions  
of packets, and normally involve only a single connection.  
 
Useful algorithms for mining the unstructured data portions of packets 
automatically are an open research question.  Stolfo et al. used domain knowledge to add 
features that look for suspicious behavior in the data portions, such as the number of 
failed login attempts.  These features are called ``content'' features.  
 
A complete listing of the set of features defined for the connection records is 








feature name description  type 
duration  length (number of seconds) of the connection  continuous 
protocol_type  type of the protocol, e.g. tcp, udp, etc.  discrete 
service  network service on the destination, e.g., http, telnet, 
etc.  
discrete 
src_bytes  number of data bytes from source to destination  continuous 
dst_bytes  number of data bytes from destination to source  continuous 
flag  normal or error status of the connection  discrete  
land  1 if connection is from/to the same host/port; 0 
otherwise  
discrete 
wrong_fragment  number of “wrong'' fragments  continuous 
urgent  number of urgent packets  continuous 
Table 17.   Basic features of individual TCP connections. 
 
 
feature name description  type 
hot  number of “hot'' indicators continuous 
num_failed_logins  number of failed login attempts  continuous 
logged_in  1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise  discrete 
num_compromised  number of “compromised'' conditions  continuous 
root_shell  1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise  discrete 
su_attempted  1 if “su root'' command attempted; 0 otherwise  discrete 
num_root  number of “root'' accesses  continuous 
num_file_creations  number of file creation operations  continuous 
num_shells  number of shell prompts  continuous 
num_access_files  number of operations on access control files  continuous 
num_outbound_cmds number of outbound commands in an ftp session  continuous 
is_hot_login  1 if the login belongs to the ``hot'' list; 0 
otherwise  
discrete 
is_guest_login  1 if the login is a ``guest''login; 0 otherwise  discrete 




















feature name description  type 
count  number of connections to the same host as the 
current connection in the past two seconds  
continuous 
 Note: The following features refer to these same-
host connections. 
 
serror_rate  % of connections that have ``SYN'' errors  continuous 
rerror_rate  % of connections that have ``REJ'' errors  continuous 
same_srv_rate  % of connections to the same service  continuous 
diff_srv_rate  % of connections to different services  continuous 
srv_count  number of connections to the same service as the 
current connection in the past two seconds  
continuous 
 Note: The following features refer to these same-
service connections. 
 
srv_serror_rate  % of connections that have ``SYN'' errors  continuous 
srv_rerror_rate  % of connections that have ``REJ'' errors  continuous 
srv_diff_host_rate  % of connections to different hosts  continuous 
Table 19.   Traffic features computed using a two-second time window. 
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